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ABOUT THIS EVENT 
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies held its fi rst 
economic recovery workshop, Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods 
in Post-Confl ict Situations, from October 26-29, 2008, in Monterey, 
California. The interactive workshop, which was designed and facilitated 
by Dr. Nat J. Colletta and Dr. Sophal Ear, brought together 40 practitioners 
from the different groups of actors charged with rebuilding fragile states. 
Participants discussed the challenges and trade-offs of various economic 
recovery priorities and strategies, explored best practices and lessons 
learned from past initiatives, and crafted possible job creation solutions 
for different countries in crisis.  
  
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and hosts 
educational programs for stabilization and reconstruction 
practitioners, including representatives from US and 
international nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
government civilian agencies, and the armed forces. Established by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision and congressional support of 
Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs to 
foster dialogue among practitioners, as well as to help them develop new 
strategies and refi ne best practices to improve the effectiveness of their 
important global work. 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also 
contributes to the university’s research and graduate degree programs. For 
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1Leading scholars have aptly 
documented the havoc that extended 
confl ict wreaks on countries. While 
the political and social injustices 
perpetuated by elites are myriad, 
the destruction and depletion of a 
country’s economic, social, and human 
capital often leaves the longest-
lasting effects. As elites cement their 
grasp on power, they typically seize 
natural resources and other assets, 
destroy critical infrastructures, 
neglect public services, and force 
knowledge workers to fl ee. Valuable 
resources, such as oil, narcotics, or 
diamonds, can extend a civil war by 
a decade or more, providing elites 
with the means and motivation to 
fi nance ongoing military operations or 
buy cooperation. The costs of long-
term confl ict are high. By the end of 
a civil war, a country’s economy can 
plummet by 15% or more, and it could 
take a nation a full 21 years to return 
to the economic level it would have 
achieved without war.1
“If confl ict is so costly, why 
does it occur?” asked Dr. Robert 
McNabb, Associate Professor of 
Naval Economics at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, a speaker 
at Creating Jobs and Rebuilding 
Livelihoods in Post-Confl ict 
Situations, the workshop hosted 
by the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies in Monterey, 
The Confl ict 
Environment 
If you are poor it is very diffi cult to conduct 
an insurgency. People are economic 
agents and respond to incentives.
– Dr. Robert McNabb, Naval Postgraduate School”
“
Breakout groups afforded participants with 
a forum for brainstorming innovative job 
creation strategies for a wide array of post-
confl ict environments. 
California from October 26-29, 
2008. “The common wisdom is 
that civil war results from political 
or religious grievances. If you are 
poor, however, it is very diffi cult to 
conduct an insurgency. People are 
economic agents and respond to 
incentives,” said Dr. McNabb.
Using Rwanda and Iraq as case 
studies, Dr. McNabb discussed the 
role of resource scarcity, economic 
incentives provided by elites, and 
social conditions in both instigating 
and perpetuating violence. Scarcity 
alone is not suffi cient cause for 
violence, said Dr. McNabb, but when 
combined with other factors it can 
prove to be a powerful catalyst. 
In Rwanda, a land redistribution 
system that enabled Hutus to 
take free and clear title to Tutsi 
land, provided that all claimants 
were dead, helped motivate 
widespread genocide. And in Iraq, 
a sheik’s edict provided Mahdi 
Army members with the religious 
sanction they needed to confi scate 
Sunni property. As actors design 
interventionary efforts to stabilize 
and then rebuild failed states, they 
should ensure that their efforts 
reduce these powerful economic 
incentives, while strengthening ties 
between states and their citizens. 
The years following a civil war 
are extremely precarious, as 
noted scholar Dr. Paul Collier has 
demonstrated in his extensive 
research on economic development 
and confl ict in fragile states. 
Collier’s research has found that 
42.1% of countries with stagnant 
economies lapse back into confl ict 
within a decade, but those able 
to achieve economic growth of 
10% annually can reduce this risk 
to 26.9%.2 Given that so many of 
the initiatives stabilization and 
reconstruction (S&R) actors execute 
— rebuilding public infrastructures, 
transforming institutions, promoting 
democracy — take years or 
even decades to implement and 
sustain, how can practitioners 
help struggling countries make 
short-term gains that will shore 
up a fragile peace, buying time 
and goodwill for these longer-term 
initiatives to take root?
Numerous scholars and development 
organizations have argued that 
promoting economic recovery is 
the single most important task S&R 
actors can accomplish to forestall 
a return to confl ict and allow local 
communities to reap the benefi t of 
a peace dividend. And given that 
civil wars and their aftermath create 
disenfranchised populations — ex-
combatants, internally displaced 
persons, confl ict victims, and youth 
among them — job creation programs 
are a logical fi rst line of defense. 
Whether they take the form of 
training programs, apprenticeships, 
or direct employment, job creation 
programs bolster fragile economies 
while putting at-risk populations 
to work. Employing ex-militants is 
especially critical. “If there are no 
jobs, ex-militants will turn to what 
they know best, which is rent-
seeking at the barrel of a gun,” said 
Dr. Colletta, a workshop facilitator 
who has helped spearhead the World 
Bank’s peacebuilding and S&R work 
around the globe for the past several 
decades. S&R actors know that to 
eradicate the economic incentives 
that helped fuel confl ict, they 
must create new, more egalitarian 
2
If there are no jobs, ex-militants will turn to 
what they know best, which is rent-seeking 
at the barrel of a gun.
                   –  Dr. Nat J. Colletta, workshop 




Source: Tjip Walker and Melissa Brown, US Agency for International Development. Dr. 
Sophal Ear stressed that states can slip and out of vulnerability and crisis, just as individuals 
move in and out of poverty.
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incentives that address the needs 
of peace spoilers, while creating 
a broader range of sustainable 
employment and livelihood 
opportunities for local populations. 
Creating Jobs and Rebuilding 
Livelihoods helped participants, 
who included 40 representatives 
from both US and international 
nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), government 
civilian agencies, and the armed 
forces, explore the full range of 
issues involved with rebuilding 
the economies of post-confl ict 
states. Dr. Colletta and Dr. Ear 
brought fi eld-tested frameworks 
and resources, best practices, and 
academic and practitioner insights 
to their role as co-facilitators of 
the workshop. Dr. Colletta and Dr. 
Ear used individual presentations, 
group discussions, and case studies 
to help participants explore 
new concepts and brainstorm 
targeted approaches to solving 
job creation challenges in post-
confl ict environments as various 
as Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo, 
Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Uganda. 
CSRS provides cross-community 
learning opportunities for S&R 
practitioners, who bring a wealth 
of experience to share with their 
peers. CSRS designs interactive 
workshops across fi ve educational 
themes: health and humanitarian 
affairs, institution building and 
security sector reform, stabilization 
and reconstruction skills and tools, 
economic recovery, and maritime 
and naval affairs. Creating Jobs and 
Rebuilding Livelihoods served as 
the inaugural event for CSRS’s new 
economic recovery theme.
Participants use CSRS events to 
increase their cognitive learning, 
enhance critical skills, and broaden 
professional networks they can 
leverage in the future. “CSRS works 
hard to create a place and process 
where S&R practitioners can turn 
experience into expertise,” said 
Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director. 
WORKSHOP THEMES
Numerous speakers from academia, 
NGOs, IGOs, and government civilian 
agencies shared frameworks to 
increase practitioners’ understanding 
of post-confl ict environments and 
their economic complexity and 
introduce new frameworks they 
could use to assess on-the-ground 
conditions and customize their 
own approaches. In addition, they 
discussed successes and failures 
from past and current jobs creation 
programs around the world. Key 
themes that emerged from the multi-
day workshop included the following 
economic recovery imperatives:
•  Performing a Confl ict Analysis
     As they move into diverse post-
confl ict environments, S&R actors 
should perform a detailed study of 
the social and political conditions 
they face on the ground. Dr. 
Colletta shared a framework he 
had helped to develop at the 
World Bank that evaluated such 
variables as social and ethnic 
relations, governance and political 
institutions, human rights and 
security, economic structure and 
performance, the environment and 
natural resources, and external 
forces. Organizations that provide a 
confl ict analysis are able to develop 
highly customized programs that 
meet communities’ real needs and 
aspirations, said Dr. Colletta. 
•  Being Sensitive to Context
S&R practitioners should ensure 
that their programs address host 
government priorities and not 
try to force-fi t initiatives that 
have worked well elsewhere. 
Speakers cited numerous examples 
of S&R experts proposing or 
implementing actions that 
Learning Objectives
Creating Jobs and Rebuilding Livelihoods was designed to 
help participants achieve the following learning objectives:
•  Develop a deeper understanding of post-confl ict economic forces 
that infl uence stability, the rebuilding of livelihoods, and job creation
•  Gain familiarity with operational tools for designing livelihood 
and job creation programs
•  Explore a range of policy and programmatic approaches to 
rebuilding livelihoods and promoting job creation and economic 
recovery in countries emerging from armed confl ict
•  Enhance their understanding of — and professional networks 
among — the other communities involved in post-confl ict 
reconstruction operations
4CSRS hosts several events a year to help S&R practitioners deepen their understanding of 
complex issues, improve their skills, and expand their professional networks.
were immediately rejected by 
important stakeholders, such as 
rebel leaders or host government 
personnel, because they violated 
cultural mores or tried to replace 
local structures with Western 
ideals. For example, Ms. Clare 
Lockhart of the Institute for State 
Effectiveness cited an anecdote 
where an American expert 
developed a new tax law for the 
Government of Afghanistan when 
there was already a functioning 
one in place. And Dr. Colletta, 
who has worked with the 
Government of the Philippines 
and separatist Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front organization 
to craft a peace agreement, 
described how critical failures, 
such as negotiators’ refusal 
to address ancestral domain 
and requirements that the 
Moros, an arms-bearing culture, 
disarm, doomed peace talks. 
In such a scenario, “It may 
not be appropriate to start 
with a disarmament-led DDR* 
process,” said Dr. Colletta. 
“Instead, it may be better to 
start with a reintegration-led 
process.” It is important not to 
take a prescriptive approach, 
but instead study the local 
environment and design programs 
that meet critical community 
needs and objectives. 
• Reducing Confl ict Drivers
    Economic recovery programs 
should address and reduce the 
conditions that led to violence 
to reduce the chance of its 
resurgence. Chief among them: 
economic drivers that favor one 
group over another, resource 
scarcity, and perverse social 
capital. Ethnic differences, which 
are often singled out as a key 
factor in precipitating violence, 
typically are not the linchpin, but 
instead are a tool elites use to 
motivate and mobilize disaffected 
citizens experiencing scarcity. 
• Promoting Good Governance 
    Governance is inextricably 
intertwined with state 
effectiveness and economic 
development, a fact which host 
governments are usually well 
aware of. A country that can 
improve its governance capacity 
reaps a 300% dividend in per-
capita income growth over the 
Upcoming CSRS Events
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•  Working in the Same Space 
September 20-24, 2009 
(tentative)
*Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
5long-term.3 However, very few 
countries educate citizens on key 
governance issues, such as the 
mission of state institutions and 
the reasons behind important 
civil processes. Said an NGO 
representative: “When we 
speak with government and 
military offi cials in post-confl ict 
environments, we ask them what 
they see is the most signifi cant 
threat to security. They usually 
say poor governance — or the 
mismanagement of public goods.” 
While it can be diffi cult and 
perhaps inadvisable for external 
actors to build state authority, 
they can foster dialogue over 
policy goals and help educate 
local populations on the 
importance of good governance 
and how their state’s policies, 
institutions, and processes 
infl uence and protect their lives 
— and livelihoods. 
•  Understanding 
Cultural Narratives 
    Individuals are part of a larger-
scale cultural and historical 
narrative. Seminal events, such 
as 9/11 or the destruction of 
Samarra’s golden mosque, can 
serve as collective traumas and 
reshape narratives, casting one 
people group as victims and 
another as perpetrators. Trapped 
within their own narratives, 
people may respond to cultural 
cues or stories that seem credible 
to them, rather than rationally 
calculate the cost-benefi t ratio of 
participating in violence. Effective 
economic recovery programs 
should include a social component 
that evaluates individual and group 
level motivations and tracks how 
they shift over time in response to 
political and cultural changes. 
•  Addressing the 
Consequences of Confl ict 
The physical short- and long-term 
dimensions of confl ict are readily 
apparent, from the destruction 
of physical infrastructure and 
an aid-dependent culture, to 
reduced economic growth and 
depleted resources. However, the 
psychological manifestations of 
violence may be more subtle and 
often aren’t adequately addressed 
by donors. In the aftermath of 
confl ict, local populations may 
be extremely myopic in their 
thinking and focus only on their 
individual gains, whereas over 
the longer-term they may adopt 
a fatalistic attitude toward 
violence or perceive greater risk 
than actually exists. In countries 
where violence has become part 
of the culture, such as Colombia, 
successful programs address the 
THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
Government and military offi cials in 
post-confl ict environments typically cite 
poor governance or the mismanagement of 
public goods as the biggest threat to 
state security.
                   –  NGO Representative”
“
Dr. Sophal Ear (left) and Dr. Nat J. Colletta (right) created and taught the workshop curricula. 
Ben Oppenheim (center) of the University of California at Berkeley provided daily synopses to 
help participants digest and retain the workshop’s robust content.
Workshop Facilitators
Dr. Nat J. Colletta was the founding manager of the World Bank’s Confl ict 
Prevention and Post Confl ict Reconstruction Unit. He now teaches at New 
College and works with a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies 
and governments, advising organizations extensively on confl ict, security, 
and development matters. Dr. Sophal Ear, an assistant professor in the 
National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
has more than a decade of experience in development consulting, with 
a focus on Southeast Asia. His work experience including stints with 
the United Nations Development Programme in East Timor, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the World Bank.
psychological needs of vulnerable 
populations, who need help 
adapting to changed gender, 
familial, and societal roles. In 
addition, these programs provide 
at-risk populations with more 
positive outlets for expressing 
negative emotion, as well as the 
tools to manage it. 
• Changing Social Capital
     In post-confl ict environments, 
people typically embrace 
bonding, or inward-looking social 
capital, that favors primary 
group family over secondary 
group community identifi cation. 
This type of social capital can be 
benefi cial for survival in times of 
dire crisis, but over the medium- 
to long-term it forestalls societal 
progress. As a consequence, S&R 
actors need to promote more 
outward-reaching, bridging 
social capital, which cuts across 
ethnic, religious, and other 
divides and provides the risk 
taking, networked relationships, 
and incentives people need 
to invest in progress and build 
a new future. In addition, it 
is important that the state 
strengthen vertical social capital 
with communities, providing 
inclusive voice and choice and 
building a social compact of 
legitimacy and trust with its 
citizens. (See graphic on page 7.)
•  Balancing Short-term Goals 
with Sustainability
    Most job creation efforts are 
short-term in focus, as donors 
seek to jumpstart the local 
economy with a combination 
of cash for work, microfi nance 
grants, apprenticeships, and other 
tools. As they design programs, 
S&R actors need to evaluate how 
they can build host government 
capacity to transition successfully 
from stabilization to recovery. In 
addition, they should carefully 
consider unintended impacts their 
interventionary efforts may create. 
For example, building paved 
roads, high-tech bridges, or state-
of-the-art facilities may not be 
sustainable if local populations do 
not adopt them or cannot sustain 
them. Donors often don’t provide 
maintenance budgets or expertise, 
and thus new infrastructures 
quickly fall into disrepair. 
•  Bolstering, Not Distorting 
The Local Economy
     Numerous workshop participants 
discussed how donors can disrupt 
the local economy by setting high 
wage scales or bringing an infl ux 
of aid workers into the area. 
When this happens, highly skilled 
workers leave the host government 
or other institutions to work for 
donors. Hence, the stereotype of 
doctors, who could help rebuild 
the health services infrastructure, 
driving taxis for donors because 
they are better compensated, 
is a reality that has numerous 
negative long-term implications. 
These issues can be mitigated by 
6
Pictured in foreground: Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Byrd, US Army, of the US Asia Pacifi c 
Center for Security Studies. 
It is important that the state strengthen 
vertical social capital with communities, 
providing inclusive voice and choice and 
building a social compact of legitimacy 
and trust with its citizens.”
“
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7involving local organizations in 
the training and hiring of staff 
and outsourcing as much work as 
possible to local organizations. 
Whatever their approach, actors 
should take care not to set 
unrealistic expectations or create 
a shadow economy that will 
disappear when aid dollars dry up.
FIXING FAILED STATES 
Ms. Lockhart, who was part of 
a small cadre of actors involved 
with planning for a post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, offered a bird’s-eye 
view on the successes and failures 
of the US Government and other 
actors’ work to create a legitimate 
state. Successes included creating 
a simple framework of high 
priority objectives through the 
Bonn Agreement, involving Afghan 
traders in converting the currency 
system, contracting directly with 
telecommunications providers to 
spur mass adoption of cell phones, 
and creating transparent mechanisms 
for dispersing cash grants to villages. 
However, Ms. Lockhart also cited 
numerous failures, including 
policy decisions that resulted in 
unplanned and severe economic 
consequences. Among them: not 
considering the economy fully in 
stabilization planning or developing 
an effective transition budget; not 
allocating enough money to pay 
Afghanistan’s 240,000 civil servants, 
which caused a huge exodus of 
highly skilled workers from the 
government; and not ensuring 
transparency around resource and 
contract disbursement. 
Ms. Lockhart teamed with Mr. 
Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s former 
fi nance minister, to cofound the 
Institute for State Effectiveness 
and study how countries tackle 
the challenges of statebuilding. 
Evaluating countries and regions 
from Singapore, Spain, Ireland, 
and the United Arab Emirates, to 
the American South to research 
their book Fixing Failed States, Ms. 
Lockhart and Mr. Ghani pinpointed 
key success factors, including: 
•  Leveraging a team of leaders and 
managers who have vision and 
fl exibility and are committed to 
the statebuilding process, rather 
than depending upon a single 
leader or personality to galvanize 
consensus for the path forward.
•  Creating a compact between the 
state and its citizens, not just 
between the state and international 
actors and ensuring that the state, 
rather than external actors, owns 
the statebuilding process.
•  Maintaining integrity and 
transparency in managing public 
fi nance and using as much 
local labor as possible, rather 
THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
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HORIZONTAL  SOCIAL  CAPITAL
Source: Dr. Colletta, workshop presentation. 
than siphoning off assets, using 
favored vendors, and paying for 
incomplete work.
•  Making massive investments in 
education and technical skills 
development, rather than spending 
monies on technical assistance 
or succumbing to donor-driven 
investment fads.
•  Creating the infrastructure needed 
to develop markets and enter new 
industries, while fully utilizing core 
assets such as fuel licenses and 
mineral resources.
•  Promoting the middle class, by 
building housing and industry 
centers for workers, rather than 
marginalizing key groups, such 
as youth, who can become a 
valuable part of the workforce.
•  Developing a well-thought-out 
strategy for competing in the global 
market and mapping goals to key 
investments and policy decisions, 
rather than making short-sighted 
policy decisions.
EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
THE STABILIZATION PHASE
S&R practitioners shared job 
creation and livelihood development 
strategies from across their 
communities. In some countries, 
S&R actors may simply strive to 
create a “holding pattern,” or an 
“interim stabilization measure” such 
as job and training opportunities 
to keep ex-militants focused until 
the economy can support them. In 
others, where economic conditions 
are more conducive to rapid change, 
actors may seek to jumpstart a 
nonformal economy where artisans 
and self-employed individuals can 
support their families, even if they 
are not contributing to the tax base; 
help at-risk populations develop 
the right skills to integrate into the 
workforce; or become entrepreneurs 
by training side-by-side with 
established business owners. 
Job Creation: An 
IGO Perspective
Mr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli of the 
United Nations’ (UN) International 
Labour Organization spoke about 
his agency’s work to develop 
employment opportunities that 
integrate the work of multiple UN 
agencies, much as the UN’s cluster 
system has done for the various 
organizations that provide disaster 
relief services. “There are so many 
players. Within this sphere, we try 
and homogenize or structure the 
interventions of each UN agency 
to maximize its comparative 
advantage,” said Mr. Kiniger-Passigli. 
UN programs seek to balance 
stability with social equity, 
recognizing that targeting and 
empowering certain groups, such 
as ex-combatants, at the expense 
of others, may create distrust 
among local communities. Other 
critical factors to consider include 
security challenges, a lack of 
capital, weak institutions, and 
high youth employment. The UN 
typically launches three parallel, 
interlinked tracks within 18 
months of deploying personnel to 
affected areas: 
•  Stabilization, which provides 
immediate income generation 
and emergency employment 
opportunities using programs 
such as cash for work, food aid, 
livelihood startup, and skills 
training for vulnerable populations, 
such as ex-combatants, returnees, 
and others.
•  Reintegration, which builds 
local employment by creating 
community-level infrastructures 
and microfi nance opportunities to 
support new businesses.
•  Transition, which seeks to 
create sustainable livelihoods 
by developing an enabling 
environment in both the public 
and private sectors and promoting 
community ownership of economic 
growth initiatives. 
Participants questioned whether 
it was possible to build capacity 
within the host government and 
transition programs in such a rapid 
8
In some countries, S&R actors may 
seek to create a “holding pattern” with 
job and training opportunities to keep 
ex-militants focused until the economy 
can support them. In more conducive 




timeframe, stating that the UN 
might be setting up expectations 
it could not deliver on. However, 
donor funding requirements 
necessarily drive how programs 
are structured and executed. 
Participants acknowledged that 
donors’ changing priorities or 
compressed timelines can short-
circuit job creation programs’ 
successfulness. “We have 
challenges getting funding for local 
recovery,” acknowledged an IGO 
member. “This is a diffi culty that 
we are trying to overcome, which 
is to help donors appreciate and 
fund this type of intervention.” 
Job Creation: A Government 
Civilian Agency Perspective
Mr. David Dod spoke about the 
US Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) efforts to 
create jobs, using such strategies 
as providing temporary employment 
through cash for work, offering 
targeted support for livelihoods and 
self-employment, and rebuilding 
community infrastructures. Mr. Dod 
provided two case studies: one in 
Timor-Leste, where a generic jobs 
creation program met with limited 
success, and another in Liberia, 
where a more comprehensive, 
targeted approach produced longer-
lasting results.
JOB CREATION CASE STUDIES FOR 
THE STABILIZATION PHASE
Timor-Leste
Working in Timor-Leste in 2000, 
USAID sought to jumpstart the 
local economy by implementing 
a standard jobs creation program 
to bridge the gap until longer-
term funding could be put in 
place. The program emphasized 
youth employment and provided 
a simple standard package of 
fi nancial support for rebuilding 
local facilities and cash to support 
local employment. USAID did not 
conduct the upfront assessment 
it usually does with each mission 
because of its desire to ensure that 
at-risk unemployed youth were 
immediately employed. Another 
challenge was the limited labor 
pool; donor competition for skilled 
workers dramatically infl ated 
wages, creating unsustainable 
community expectations. 
Liberia
USAID ran a Community 
Infrastructure Project in Liberia 
from 2004-2008 that combined 
an aggressive DDR program with 
employment generation and 
training initiatives. The program 
used a single large contractor 
with 38 grantees who helped to 
form local NGOs. USAID provided 
$50 million in initial funding, 
with an additional $50 million 
in subsequent monies allocated 
to employ approximately 25,000 
individuals, two-thirds of whom 
were ex-combatants, as well 
as place 1,000 individuals in 
apprenticeships. Ex-combatants 
were given the opportunity 
to resettle and register for 
employment or vocational 
Pictured from left to right: Dr. Bruce Tolentino, The Asia Foundation; Lieutenant 
Commander Edward Fiorentino, US Navy; and Mr. Phillip Rush, the Bonn International 
Center for Conversion. 
We have challenges getting funding for 
local recovery. This is a diffi culty we are 
trying to overcome.





Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces offered 
a detailed overview of the 
Government of Colombia’s efforts 
to reintegrate Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) members and other rebels 
back into society, a program 
spearheaded by the Offi ce of the 
High Counselor for the Economic 
and Social Reintegration of 
Illegally Armed Persons. Over the 
past six years, the Government of 
Colombia has demobilized 48,000 
individuals, 37,000 of whom are in 
the process of being reintegrated. 
If FARC members continue to 
demobilize at their current pace 
through the end of 2009, the 
group will be so attenuated in 
numbers that the government will 
be able to force its leaders to the 
negotiation table.
Unlike many other programs, 
the government itself owns 
and operates the reintegration 
process, giving it some unique 
advantages over donor-driven 
programs: high capacity and 
political will to sustain what 
will certainly be a decades-
long process, human capital 
to provide one-to-one and 
community services, and 
private sector support to 
broaden the net of job creation 
opportunities. Of equal 
importance, the state-driven 
initiative integrates more 
seamlessly into the government’s 
peacebuilding processes than 
would donor-driven programs. 
Colombia’s demobilization 
program includes a start-up 
phase of 18 months, where the 
state assesses the territory for 
the presence of armed groups 
and the condition of the local 
economy, and then takes military 
control of the area. Once 
security has been established, 
the state reasserts its authority, 
providing essential functions 
such as policing, justice, and 
the rule of law, and then begins 
to build the economy and social 
institutions. The state involves 
local communities in the 
recovery process to strengthen 
institutional capacity and 
promote democracy. Recovery 
speed depends upon the local 
context: An urban area is much 
easier to recover than a rural 
area, where coca has been the 
sole source of revenue for local 
workers. “There is no shake-and-
bake solution for peacebuilding 
in Colombia,” warned Mr. Eder-
Garces. “Our startup phase is 18 
months, but we’re envisioning 
that the reintegration process 




3,000 - 5,000 demobilized
1,000 - 3,000 demobilized
500 - 1,000 demobilized
300 - 500 demobilized
Reintegrating the FARC: A Case Study
Colombia’s Government-Owned Approach Delivers Results
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Source: Mr. Alejandro Eder-Garces, 
workshop presentation. 
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After demobilizing from the FARC 
or other militias, armed persons 
meet with a local prosecutor, 
who reviews their records to see 
if there are outstanding warrants. 
Individuals receive a single 
opportunity to confess all of their 
crimes in return for a reduced 
sentence. While combatants 
wanted for a crime against 
humanity could be sentenced 
to a jail term of up to 60 years, 
through Colombia’s program 
they will receive a reduced 
sentence of only 4-8 years and 
subsequently be eligible to 
participate in the reintegration 
program. However, if combatants 
fail to disclose the full truth, 
and additional crimes are 
discovered, or they then engage 
in additional illegal behavior, 
they will lose their benefi ts 
and be incarcerated for the full 
length of the original sentence. 
Mr. Eder-Garces was quick to 
stress that Colombia’s program 
was not an amnesty initiative, 
as perpetrators of violence are 
required to serve time for their 
crimes and provide fi nancial 
reparation to their victims.
Colombia’s program is unique in 
that it provides support not just to 
ex-combatants, but also to their 
families and local communities. 
Since most fi ghters were recruited 
as children and have perpetrated 
and witnessed horrifi c violence, 
they have tremendous psychological 
issues. In addition, they may have 
diffi culties accepting their changed 
status and gender role, both within 
their families and communities. 
Ex-combatants receive monthly, 
in-home psychological counseling 
and training that is customized to 
their unique needs, while their 
wives receive vocational assistance 
so that they can shoulder some 
of the familial economic burden. 
The Offi ce of the High Counselor 
also works with local communities, 
to ensure they can provide the 
social and educational services 
ex-combatants and their families 
need; and the private sector, 
to create job opportunities and 
provide specialized expertise 
to individuals starting their 
own businesses. 
When the Offi ce of the High 
Counselor began the program, 
it provided ex-combatants with 
seed capital to start businesses. 
“We were trying to make 
everyone an entrepreneur,” 
said Mr. Eder-Garces. However, 
this approach had a high 
failure rate. As a consequence, 
the program began providing 
training and apprenticeships 
to mainstream ex-combatants 
into the workforce, monitoring 
them for psychological stability 
and employability. In addition, 
the Offi ce has done extensive 
outreach to the private sector 
to overcome companies’ natural 
reluctance to hire ex-combatants.
At a cost of $8,000 to $10,000 a 
person, Colombia’s reintegration 
program is costly, but its success 
in reintegrating ex-combatants 
and debilitating the FARC has 
proven its worth. Each combatant 
who demobilizes provides 
valuable intelligence, noted 
Mr. Eder-Garces, including the 
information that was used to 
rescue famed political prisoner Ms. 
Ingrid Betancourt. Demobilizing 
combatants have proven to be the 
most powerful marketing tool the 
Government of Colombia needs, 
as they contact peers who are 
still in the FARC and motivate 
them to leave its fold. “This is an 
investment to stop violence and 
grow the economy,” he said. “Our 
economy is up fi vefold in the past 
several years.” The program is 
government-funded, with about 
half of the $600 million budget 
coming from military sources 
and the other half coming from 
civilian sources. The Offi ce 
provides a purely coordinative 
role and receives funding solely 
for its staff.••
CSRS events provide participants 
with the opportunity to increase their 
professional networks, both within and 
across communities. 
THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
training. Of the two programs, 
apprenticeships were far more 
successful, as the training did 
not provide ex-combatants with 
viable job skills and the local 
economy was not robust enough 
to absorb them. 
In addition, USAID provided 
sector-specifi c assistance for 
agriculture, such as irrigation 
structures, rubber collection 
training, and farming support, 
and programs to rebuild local 
community infrastructures in fi ve 
separate counties. Roads were a 
top priority: A local contractor 
provided design and engineering 
services, and local laborers 
rebuilt rural and paved roads. 
However, USAID had diffi culties 
using the engineering contractor, 
which made a number of 
mistakes. In addition, it did not 
allocate a budget for maintaining 
the roads. 
Mozambique
Dr. Colletta discussed the 
World Bank’s efforts to employ 
100,000 ex-combatants who were 
reentering Mozambique society 
in 1995. The Bank piloted three 
different models: a training 
program where ex-combatants 
could cash vouchers with local 
vendors; public vocational 
school investment; and subsidies 
for small businesses to hire 
additional employees. According 
to Dr. Colletta, the voucher system 
was a non-starter, due to its 
administrative requirements, and 
the investment and timeframe 
required to build and maintain 
public schools exceeded the 
program budget and timeframe. 
However, the apprenticeship 
program was successful: It provided 
businesses with free labor and 
ex-combatants with an intensive 
immersion experience into running 
a local business.••





The World Bank has developed 
a sophisticated ex-combatant 
profi ling tool to customize its 
DDR programs. The questionnaire 
develops a detailed picture of 
ex-combatants, evaluating their 
personal characteristics, needs, 
and aspirations, and leverages 
local offi cials to assess market 
opportunities and institutional 
capacity. The Bank also works to 
develop a robust understanding 
of the local context, so that it 
has a clear understanding of 
critical factors, including confl ict 
drivers, political will, community 
character, and governance, among 
others. It is critical to involve 
local leaders in fi ne-tuning survey 
instruments, so that these tools 
explore the right issues. Said an 
NGO member: “When we were 
devising our survey instrument, we 
brought it to our stakeholders in 
Southern Sudan. There were a lot 
of things we didn’t know, because 
we weren’t on the ground. Is a 
boma larger than a paya? How far 
is the village from the clinic or the 
police station? These factors are 
important to consider, when you 
are designing services or studying 
where to put new infrastructure.” 
Best Practices 
and Resources for 
Job Creation
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We included local stakeholders in 
devising our survey instrument, so that 
we considered the right factors when we 
designed services and studied where to 
put new infrastructures.
                    – NGO representative ”
“
Participants discussed fragile states’ 
needs, including security, youth 
and ex-combatant employment, 
and access to health and education 
services, among other issues. 
Dr. Heather Gregg of the Naval Postgraduate School shares insights with the UN’s Mr. 
Donato Kiniger-Passigli.
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Participants discussed survey 
instruments and how diffi cult it is 
to create a questionnaire that will 
accurately map the fi eld environment. 
“I’m really uncomfortable that we 
are making long, long lists about 
the things we don’t know, when 
we are trying to do an intervention 
for a community group,” said an 
NGO member. “The unknowns 
will remain just that: unknown.” 
Dr. Colletta agreed, but said that 
the questionnaire enabled fi eld 
staff to have a dialogue with local 
stakeholders and discover critical 
variables in the process. “Don’t 
discount the consultative process 
and what you will learn from the 
community. If you learn that 20% of 
the combatants have AIDS, then you 
are going to design a program that has 
a health component.” A government 
civilian agency member said that 
actors had to balance consultation 
needs with the impetus to act, 
to reduce the threat of confl ict. 
However, maintaining fl exibility and 
coordinating with other actors and 
donors was critical, so that parties 
could change course if they were 
headed in the wrong direction. 
The group discussed donor trends, 
and how they can negatively impact 
recovery work. Said one participant: 
“In insecure environments, we run 
into what we call the ‘fl avor of the 
month.’ Money will be available for 
a certain set of priorities, and so 
everyone will develop programs for 
those objectives. Then two years 
later, everyone is onto something 
else.” A military offi cer asked how 
S&R practitioners reconcile local 
community desires and donor 
priorities. Countered two government 
civilian agency members: “It’s worse 
than that. It’s what the community 
wants, what donors believe should 
be done, what Congress is willing 
to fund, and what the White House 
wants as policy.” Actors must seek 
to align these different agendas, 
while building sustainable solutions 
that truly address community needs. 
A possible solution to navigating 
the maze of competing priorities? 
“Salesmanship,” said a military 
offi cer. “You have to package what 
they want to hear with what they 
want to get done.” In addition, S&R 
practitioners may be able to use 
creative approaches to implement 
their programs, while still adhering to 
their organizations’ guidelines. 
BEST PRACTICES FOR 
JOB CREATION 
Speakers and participants offered 
an array of best practices for S&R 
practitioners seeking to design 
successful programs for the 
stabilization phase, as well as avoid 
common pitfalls. Actors should be 
prepared to:
•  Monitor fragile states with watching 
briefs, so that they understand the 
full range of issues these countries 
BEST PRACTICES AND RESOURCES FOR JOB CREATION
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face and can prepare effectively for 
deployment. Once on the ground, 
actors can use their understanding 
of issues to structure effective 
discussions with local communities 
and rapidly ramp up programs. 
•  Provide funding directly to 
community groups to allow them 
to set local wages and increase 
local buy-in for the jobs creation 
programs. Community groups will 
select the most worthy recipients 
and ensure that wage structures are 
appropriate for the local economy.  
•  Keep material costs down so that 
actors can maximize funding for 
labor and accelerate program 
implementation. “The better is the 
enemy of the good. If you try and 
do too much, you will slow things 
down,” said a government civilian 
agency member. “From the time 
we initiated a program to when we 
implemented it was sometimes just 
72 hours.”
•  Hire ex-combatants through 
community groups to help 
reconfi gure dangerous groups, 
such as gangs and militias. But 
actors should do “due diligence” 
on prospective partners, as some 
community groups may be allied 
with the very groups practitioners 
are trying to break and others will 
not have survived the confl ict.
•  Use apprenticeships as a low-cost 
model to train ex-combatants not 
only in specifi c skills, but also in 
critical business practices. These 
opportunities should be paired with 
some type of grant program, so 
that graduates can apply for loans 
and form their own businesses. 
Since nine out of 10 businesses 
Graphic represents a visual composite 
of imagery provided by Dr. Colletta in his 
workshop presentations. 
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in industrialized societies fail, 
donors should be realistic about 
promoting entrepreneurship in 
post-confl ict countries. Helping at-
risk populations gain the right skills 
to enter the workforce will likely 
yield more sustainable results. 
•  Provide psycho-social outlets, such 
as long-term counseling and sports 
programs, to offer communities 
a constructive outlet for venting 
hostility, while promoting social 
reconciliation. The mental 
health issues ex-combatants and 
local populations face after a 
sustained period of confl ict can 
often be quite severe. Creating 
socially acceptable outlets for 
ex-combatants to process their 
anger and frustration can keep 
them focused on the future, 
maximizing opportunities for skill 
development and wage earning, 
while minimizing familial abuse or 
other ills.  
•  Be clear about job creation 
program objectives, whether 
its purpose is to regalvanize 
the economy or simply create 
a “holding pattern,” moving 
at-risk populations into fairly 
compensated training programs 
or apprenticeships until the local 
economy can recover enough 
to absorb them. Map program 
objectives to the local context, 
studying the labor market, 
the absorptive capacity of the 
local economy, and credit and 
fi nancial markets. On-the-ground 
realities will necessarily shape 
or potentially curtail the type of 
programs that can be launched 
and sustained successfully. 
•  Involve community groups 
in designing, executing, and 
transitioning job creation 
services, to optimize early 
recovery and long-term 
sustainability. While S&R 
practitioners often provide 
technical assistance to host 
governments, consultants’ 
incentives need to be properly 
aligned with donors’ goals of 
growing local capacity. Ms. 
Lockhart cited examples of 
how technical assistance had 
been used improperly in the 
past, with consultants fi ring 
government staff to bring in 
other external actors, reducing 
the host government’s ability 
to deliver essential services 
and making it ever-more 
dependent on foreign aid. 
Instead, external actors should 
help host governments develop 
expertise and resources so that 
they can successfully take over 
actor-initiated programs. ••
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Pictured from left to right: Ms Nicole Zimmerman, Monterey Institute for International 
Studies; Colonel Mary-Ann King, US Army, 352 Civil Affairs Command; and Ms. Lejla Mulic, 
Sarajevo Headquarters, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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While a critical part of the 
stabilization phase, job creation 
programs should not continue into the 
economic recovery phase. Actors need 
to avoid the temptation of treating 
economic recovery as “development 
as usual,” said the USAID’s Dr. James 
Smith, as recovery requires a decade-
plus commitment on the behalf of 
donors and actors to create the right 
conditions that will engender long-
term economic growth. Chief among 
them: creating security and addressing 
issues, from demining roads to ending 
the political corruption that could 
precipitate a return to confl ict. In 
addition, actors need to work toward 
developing an enabling environment 
by promoting policy reforms that 
support business growth and reduce 
discrimination; and helping host 
governments build vital administrative 
capacity, including the legal, tax, and 
regulatory functions local governments 
need to manage growth. Onerous 
taxation or regulatory requirements 
can short-circuit economic growth by 
discouraging fl edgling businesses from 
investing in growing their capabilities 
or confi ning wage earners to the 
informal economy. Dr. Colletta cited 
an example where Nairobi artisans 
chose to work outside without 
resources, although a pristine new 
market was available, as they would 
have had to take a days-long journey 
to register at a central authority. The 
government lost out on valuable tax 
revenues, while the artisans likely 
suffered lost revenue opportunities 
due to the insecure nature of their 
working space.
Agriculture can provide a constant 
source of professional and economic 
opportunities, even before confl ict 
stops, as local citizens need to 
purchase food and traders continue 
operations even under extreme 
conditions, said Dr. Bruce Tolentino 
of The Asia Foundation. According to 
Dr. Tolentino, a 1% growth in farm 
production creates a corresponding 
1% or greater amount of growth in 
off-farm and non-farm production. 
The entire food supply chain benefi ts, 
as local workers create businesses to 
support the farming industry. 
Actors should work with the host 
government to make the right 
infrastructure investments and 
decisions — providing security, 
rebuilding roads, protecting 
transportation routes, improving 
irrigation, and opening public markets 
— that allow agricultural providers 
to prosper. S&R actors are enablers, 
offering educational scholarships 
for promising agriculture students, 
creating apprenticeships, and hiring 
local suppliers and craftsmen. Instead 
of hiring labor directly, actors should 
Moving Into the 
Recovery Phase
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In post-confl ict work, sequencing doesn’t 
mean phasing. We get caught up in 
the idea that certain things like security 
have to be in place before we can 
move on. You can provide security by 
creating jobs.  
                   —Military participant”
“
outsource these services, contracting 
with suppliers to train and quality 
workers. In addition, they should be 
prepared to pay above-market rates 
to support the local private sector. 
Speakers offered the following best 
practices for ensuring an effective 
economic recovery:
•  Improve security by addressing the 
full range of issues that led to the 
confl ict. Security is a prerequisite 
for a healthy economy, breaking 
down a culture of patronage that 
favored the few at the expense 
of the many, as well as enabling 
rent-seeking behavior that stunted 
economic growth. 
•  Help host governments right-size 
their spending, allocating monies 
previously spent on sustaining 
military operations into rebuilding 
public infrastructure. While fi nding 
employment for large security 
forces is a daunting challenge for 
actors, sustaining militaries at 
their existing level can increase 
community tension and the risk of 
confl ict resurgence. 
•  Use actionable governance 
indicators (AGIs) to improve the 
design, implementation, and 
measurement of governance 
systems. The World Bank is using 
these more fi nely grained metrics 
to assess the impact of institutional 
reform on governance sub-systems, 
increasing accountability by 
bringing transparency to previously 
opaque processes and ensuring 
that they are meeting performance 
objectives, said Dr. Naazneen 
Barma. One such tool, the Public 
Financial Management Performance 
Measurement Framework, allows 
users to monitor public budgets, 
from their adherence to policy 
guidelines to their effectiveness in 
execution. Another, the Civil Service 
Human Resource Management 
Diagnostic, is designed to improve 
and depoliticize the hiring, 
management, and retention of 
highly qualifi ed civil servants, 
while creating a fi scally sustainable 
wage bill. AGI data from hundreds 
of sources is available online at 
the World Bank website (www.
worldbank.org). AGIs can help 
address the problem of leakage by 
empowering local communities with 
information on what resources they 
are due. 
•  Entice and incentivize the 
diaspora, with its skills, wealth, 
and deep knowledge of the local 
environment to return and organize 
the recovery. Attract these highly 
skilled professionals by providing 
the infrastructure resources they 
need, such as schools for their 
children, to encourage them to 
return and put their expertise to 
work for their countries. The return 
of the diaspora will help motivate 
others to make important capital 
investments in the country. 
The USAID’s Dr. James Smith provided an analysis of job creation best practices 
during the economic recovery phase. 
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•  Do not try to restore the economy, 
just rebuild it. The economy has 
dramatically changed over the 
course of the confl ict: Not only is 
it unable to support transparent 
trading and information fl ow, 
but it also cannot absorb all the 
international aid it typically 
receives in confl ict’s aftermath. 
Arguing for a slower pace of 
investment, Dr. McNabb said that 
it takes a post-confl ict country 
three years to gain enough capacity 
to absorb international funding. 
As they bring new resources to 
post-confl ict states, actors need 
to take care not to create unfair 
competition for local resources or 
to incentivize the wrong behavior.
•  Ensure that economic policies 
address critical issues, such as 
scarcity, agricultural supply, and key 
infrastructures needed to promote 
growth. “If it’s a choice between 
building a road or a warehouse, 
build the road,” said Dr. Tolentino, 
“because once the road is there, 
private industry will come in and 
build the rest.”
•  Clarify property rights to 
enable land reform, but do not 
expect or require everyone 
to own land. Scarcity may 
preclude mass ownership, and 
many individuals may prefer 
employment to the challenges 
of property management. One 
option is to give economically 
disenfranchised individuals 
shares in collective enterprises, 
such as rubber plantations in 
Malaysia or palm oil estates and 
processing plants in Colombia. 
In return for contributing their 
labor, shareholders receive regular 
dividends. However, this approach 
necessitates that there is a robust 
international commodity market 
for goods that are produced and 
effi cient market linkages, such 
as transportation and a modern 
communications infrastructure. 
•  Make sure fi nancing models 
support S&R objectives. If actors 
do not require repayment, they 
should provide cash, rather than 
commodity grants, to avoid the 
administrative burden of setting 
up repayment mechanisms and 
enable benefi ciaries to purchase 
what they truly need. “With 
cash, there is one transaction 
cost,” said Dr. Colletta, “so 
the benefi ciary gets more of 
the money. You empower them 
to make the right decisions.” 
With commodities, the donor 
price tag quickly accelerates as 
organizations must procure, ship, 
store, distribute, and account for 
goods, among other tasks. For 
many institutions, cash transfers 
are becoming the norm, as it 
enables organizations not only to 
route money to the right traders, 
but also to shift risk to them. 
•  Ensure that contracted work 
is completed before releasing 
funding, whether it is on an 
organizational or an individual 
scale. Ms. Lockhart cited the dismal 
record of contract completion in 
Afghanistan under the UN’s watch. 
Meanwhile, the Government of 
Colombia changed both its wage 
scale and disbursement model 
when offi cials realized that paying 
program participants twice the 
minimum wage, whether or 
not they completed program 
requirements, demotivated them 
from fulfi lling their obligations. 
Now, ex-combatants only receive 
minimum wage salaries if they 
complete key milestones, such as 
participating in training or going to 
counseling sessions. Ex-combatants’ 
salaries are direct-deposited into 
bank accounts that they can access 
with debit cards, so they will build 
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Source: Dr. James Smith and Mr. David Dod, USAID, workshop presentations. 
a credit history as they work their 
way through the program. “Ex-
combatants receive their stipend 
based on their performance,” said 
Mr. Eder-Garces, “so families quickly 
become both allies and auditors, 
making sure participants do what 
they need to do.”
•  Fine-tune microfi nance models 
to improve their effi cacy. The 
American Refugee Committee 
worked with West African 
business owners to develop a 
credit history by providing letters 
that cited their loan repayment 
histories and demonstrated their 
creditworthiness. If actors use 
microfi nance, they should protect 
the up to 15 lenders who support 
each borrower. Credit defaults 
not only reduce future lending 
opportunities, but also hurt 
existing businesses. 
•  Position transformative programs 
within a cultural context to 
increase their cultural acceptance. 
For example, in Afghanistan, 
marketing literacy for women as a 
tool to help infant mortality would 
likely be more successful than 
launching an education program 
for women that serves as a frontal 
assault on cultural mores with its 
emphasis on gender equality. 
•  Ensure programs consider the 
effect of confl ict and climate 
change on the ecology, in terms 
of reducing the amount of arable 
land or damaging the water 
table. For example, Darfur has 
sustained long-term damage 
to the physical environment 
that program designers must 
consider when creating recovery 
programs. Local options are 
necessarily more limited than in 
a post-confl ict environment that 
has sustained less environmental 
damage or has a greater range of 
intact natural resources. 
•  Foster the growth of 
telecommunications so 
that citizens at all levels 
can contribute to providing 
critical market intelligence, 
ensuring transparency funding 
and service provision, and 
engage in public dialogue. Ms. 
Lockhart cited the Government 
of Afghanistan’s decision to 
secure donor monies and then 
contract directly with cell phone 
providers as instrumental to the 
telecommunications revolution 
that has taken place there, 
empowering fi ve million Afghanis 
with phone access. 
•  Help foster a business-friendly 
policy climate with minimal 
regulations and controls on 
agricultural production. Educate 
the private sector about how they 
can serve the world’s poor and 
better their lives, while still making 
a profi t. Fortune 500 companies are 
increasingly turning to Asia, Africa, 
India, and the Middle East, among 
other geographies, to sell goods, 
realizing that what they do not 
make in terms of margin on product 
sales, they make in terms of scale, 
due to the vast breadth of the 
developing world and its relatively 
untapped markets.
•  Study existing industries for 
opportunities to optimize business 
processes or grow markets. USAID 
worked with Rwanda growers 
to improve coffee washing, 
introducing training, fi nancing, and 
quality control processes. Over the 
four-year project span, 72 coffee 
washing stations were installed, 40 
of which were built with project 
assistance, allowing farmers to 
nearly double exports of a more 
costly product. 
•  Understand that donor timelines 
may not map to a country’s needs 
or cultural timelines. Participants 
discussed the stabilization phase, 
a timeframe when donor funding 
is at its highest, but also a time 
when countries may be ill-prepared 
to absorb and fully utilize aid. 
While Dr. McNabb advocated a “do 
no harm” approach with lower 
levels of investment in sustainable 
infrastructures to allow fragile 
states’ economies to recover more 
organically, other participants 
stated that on-the-ground realities 
and donor priorities precluded 
such an approach. In addition, 
participants asked whether it 
was reasonable to expect job 
creation efforts to take root in the 
18 months to two years typically 
allotted to such programs during 
the stabilization phase.••
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If actors use microfi nance, they should 
protect the up to 15 lenders who support 
each borrower. Credit defaults not only 
reduce future lending opportunities, but 
also hurt existing businesses.”
“
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With their degraded infrastructures, 
depleted economies, oversized 
militaries, and vulnerable populations, 
post-confl ict environments present 
a wide array of challenges to S&R 
actors. A return to confl ict is a 
potentially grim reality for a decade 
or more, and thus the clock begins 
ticking on the new peace accord. 
As a consequence, S&R actors are 
well aware that they must deliver 
short-term gains that communities 
can see and quantify, if they are to 
buy valuable time for statebuilding 
and reconstruction. Research 
has documented that policy-only 
initiatives simply do not reduce 
confl ict risks to acceptable levels, 
but that job creation programs paired 
with peacekeeping forces reduce 
confl ict risks by more than half.4 
As actors seek to design and launch 
programs, they are also seeking 
to manage disparate tensions, 
consider the needs of a wide array of 
stakeholders, and build sustainability 
into their stabilization and early 
recovery model. For not only is the 
clock ticking on the peace accord, 
it is also ticking on donor funding. 
The majority of monies will typically 
be spent during the fi rst two years, 
at a time when host governments 
are often ill-equipped to leverage 
Conclusion
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S&R actors must deliver short-term gains 
that communities can see and quantify 
if they are to buy valuable time for 
statebuilding and reconstruction.”
“
External actors feel a sense of urgency 
to create job creation programs that will 
bolster the economy and help prevent a 
return to confl ict.
funds successfully. Workshop 
speakers provided practitioners with 
an insightful look at post-confl ict 
environments and the critical 
variables that S&R practitioners 
must consider as they design and 
launch job creation programs. In 
addition, they provided analytical 
frameworks and best practices from 
past case studies participants could 
leverage and fl exibly adapt for future 
use. Across organizations, speakers 
demonstrated a bias to developing 
simple, culturally relevant programs 
that either bought time for reforms 
to take hold, or more ideally, were 
capable of being sustained by local 
populations with a minimum of 
resources and expertise. Hence, 
artisanal apprenticeships showed 
more promise than elaborate 
entrepreneurship programs, 
community-appropriate infrastructure 
enhancement was favored over 
state-of-the-art facilities, and cash 
transfers preferred to microfi nance. 
As S&R actors deploy around the 
globe, they can leverage the valuable 
insights and tools they gained by 
participating in the Creating Jobs 
and Rebuilding Livelihoods workshop. 
Working hand-in-hand with local 
communities, actors can help the 
perpetrators and victims of violence 
come together and create a shared 
vision of the future, one where 
economic opportunities for the many 
take priority over spoils shared by a 
few and a lasting peace is fi nally able 
to deliver on its full promise.••
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3 Dr. Sophal Ear, “Governance, Fragility, and Failure: Implications for Livelihoods,” conference presentation. Statistic from 
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2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. 
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